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Between Inseparability and Distinction
Metaxology is a discourse of the between: between unity and plurality, inseparability and distinction, sameness and otherness, identity and 
difference, self and others, the univocal and the equivocal. Metaxological 
philosophy is about being responsible, through faithful discourse, to both the 
promise of univocity and the promise of equivocity.1 These concepts may sound 
abstract, yet the question must be asked: is it possible that William Desmond’s 
metaxological metaphysics could be relevant for Christian theology? If so, 
the enigmatic character of this philosophy must first be made intelligible for 
theologians if it is ever to be considered relevant and appropriated. 
Mindfulness towards Christian theology unveils several theological matters 
which paradoxically uphold both inseparability and distinction. For instance, 
in Trinitarian theology it is confessed that the Father, Son and Holy Spirit are 
three yet one; in Christology it is confessed that Jesus Christ is fully divine and 
fully human; in Soteriology it is confessed that humanity becomes one with God 
and yet remains creature; and in Ecclesiology, it is confessed that all followers 
 * Michael Fletcher is a PhD candidate in Systematic Theology at KU Leuven, Belgium. 
His primary research concerns utilizing Bonhoeffer’s theology-of-the-cross, and therefore, 
metaxology, for the purposes of ecumenism.
 1 William Desmond, Being and the Between (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 
1995), 178. 
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of Jesus Christ are the one body of Christ. These theological matters deal with 
the exact same issues of inseparability and distinction which metaxology carries 
a discourse between. It is with these issues in mind that this article intends to 
demonstrate that metaxology—as a hermeneutic of passio essendi—helps one be 
responsible in the between. Or in the theological terminology of Martin Luther 
and Dietrich Bonhoeffer, metaxology is closely associated with the theology-of-
the-cross. 
The ultimate hope is that this article will help theologians be responsible 
in the between, by utilizing metaxology and the theology-of-the-cross for 
contemporary challenges which concern both identity and difference, such 
as ecumenism and interreligious dialogue. In order to help theologians be 
responsible, firstly, I will make intelligible Desmond’s philosophical “system” 
for theologians. This is done most easily by demonstrating how it illuminates 
Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s theology-of-the-cross. Secondly, so as to remain faithful 
to the metaxological, I will demonstrate that Bonhoeffer’s theology-of-the-cross 
in fact illuminates Desmond’s metaxology. Indeed, in some ways, Bonhoeffer 
even seems to have been more metaxological than Desmond.
Bonhoeffer’s theology-of-the-cross is not a confined doctrine of the 
atonement or the work done on the cross in itself (if it were, it would not be 
akin to the metaxological). His theology-of-the-cross is rather a hermeneutic 
for viewing all of reality. Specifically, it means to continually view all things 
through the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ, and that these three 
may never be separated.2 Furthermore, it also means to view Jesus Christ as being 
fully human and fully divine, and that the one Christ-reality is both the center 
(Mitte) and the mediator (Mittler). But even more, Bonhoeffer was incredibly 
existential in wanting to know who Jesus Christ was for today, and because of 
this, Bonhoeffer’s doctrine of the church was nothing less than a community-of-
the-cross, whereby this community is called to fully participate in all aspects of 
the one Christ-reality.
Sections 1-5 will espouse Desmond’s metaxology, and section 6 will give a 
concrete praxis which goes more fully between Desmond and Bonhoeffer. The 
first 5 sections seek to elucidate Desmond primarily in his own right; however, 
occasionally, I do utilize Bonhoeffer to help illuminate Desmond. Pragmatically, 
this will serve to avoid getting too bogged down with Desmondian terminology. 
 2 Bonhoeffer is in agreement with Luther’s definition as well, for during the Heidelberg 
Disputation of 1518, Thesis 20 he stated that the theologian-of-the-cross is the person who views 
all things (including the resurrection) “through suffering and the cross.”
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Desmond is the primary interlocutor of this research. This is because I am 
of the conviction that metaxology needs to be made more accessible, especially 
for theologians. Bonhoeffer is the secondary interlocutor of this research, firstly, 
because Bonhoeffer’s critique of Hegel was almost identical to Desmond’s, and 
this parallel has never been addressed in literature. Secondly, “it is necessary to 
see Dietrich Bonhoeffer as a 20th century exemplar of what Martin Luther called 
the theology of the cross.”3 Specifically, the contemporary context is in the wake 
of Hegel, therefore, it is more appropriate to address Bonhoeffer rather than 
Luther Since explaining Desmond’s metaxology requires substantial treatment, 
I will limit fully addressing Bonhoeffer and being responsible in the between, 
for the final section. This may seem like too much is devoted towards Desmond, 
however, I maintain this structure because Desmond needs to be explained, and 
because I have elsewhere written on Bonhoeffer for those who wish to study him 
in more depth.4
Excess and Lack
One could say that the metaxological journey begins in Plato’s cave, because it 
teaches of both excess and lack. The hyperbolic givenness of the between throws 
itself beyond one’s chained body onto the walls of the cave. As this prisoner is 
unchained and journeys away from the cave, they are blinded by an excess of 
light.5 Desmond uses this platonic imagery of being blinded through describing 
it with both Aristotle and Hegel. “[T]here is a blinding by the light. We are like 
bats at sunlight, as Aristotle said, not just like owls of Minerva in the equivocal 
 3 Douglas John Hall, “Seminar: Dietrich Bonhoeffer and the Ethics of Participation,” (2004): 
1, accessed October 10, 2014, http://www.ucalgary.ca/christchair/files/christchair/Hall_D.
Bonhoeffer.pdf.
 4 For more on Bonhoeffer and how I appropriate his theology-of-the-cross, refer to my 
articles, Michael Fletcher, “Is the Church Dead? Bonhoeffer’s Theology-of-the-Cross and the 
Future of Ecumenical Ecclesiology,” Theologica Wratislaviensia 11, Dietrich Bonhoeffer na 500 
lat Reformacji (2016): 29-45; Michael Fletcher, “Bonhoeffer’s Last Words, ‘Our Victory Is 
Certain’: Recognizing and Receiving the Ecumenical Church as a Present Reality” in Beiheft 
zur Okumenischen Rundschau 177, Just Do It?! Recognition and Reception in Ecumenical 
Relations, Proceedings of the 19th Academic Consultation of the Societas Oecumenica (Leipzig: 
Evangelische Verlagsanstalt GmbH, 2018): 393-404. Furthermore, my forthcoming PhD 
dissertation from KU Leuven addresses the Bonhoefferian aspects of this article in much greater 
detail. The tentative title is, The Ecumene-of-the-Cross: A Bonhoefferian Response to the Ecumenical 
Problem as a Christological Problem.
 5 Plato, The Republic, trans. Allan Bloom, 2nd ed. (NY: Basic Books, 1991), l; 515d–516a.
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twilight of falling dusk, as Hegel said.”6 The Aristotelian bat is blinded by excess, 
whereas the Hegelian owl is blinded by lack. Both “birds” are “blinded,”7 where 
neither blinding is trivial in Desmond’s philosophy. 
Even so, Desmond is often found correcting Hegel’s lack. Hegel’s owl can 
only spread its wings at dusk, implying that philosophy is a historical journeying, 
where wisdom is groping blindly in the dark grey on grey.8 According to Hegel, 
the philosopher is blind because the lack of light and color, all is grey on grey.9 
Hegelian philosophy cannot teach of the future or even allow for a future hope, 
for it is concerned with the rationality of the past.
Desmond and Bonhoeffer both correct Hegel, but neither disregard Hegel 
(Hegel is dealt with in detail in §5.3). Desmond understands that there are two 
blindings, that of the bat and that of the owl. The first blinding is from excess; 
similar to the prisoner leaving the cave. The second blinding is from lack; similar 
to the philosopher (re)entering the cave to go tell others what has been learned. 
In both cases, there is blind groping until vision is acclimated. In the second 
instance, the danger persists in forgetting that there is an origin of excess, this 
is Desmond’s (and Bonhoeffer’s) corrective of Hegel. Hegel has neglected the 
excess. The Morning Prayer for Hegel is always ever an Evening Prayer.10 Hegel’s 
prayer is reflective, though it ultimately bends back upon itself via the other, and 
not the other as the excessive agapeic origin. 
A Hermeneutic of Desire 
Desmond began his metaxological career with a thorough examination of the 
origins of desire, whether desire comes from lack or excess. One could say that 
 6 Desmond, Being and the Between, 138.
 7 Nevertheless, bats are not birds and bats are not blinded by light because they are technically 
guided by sonar.
 8 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, “The Philosophy of Right,” in Great Book of the Western 
World, ed. Robert Maynard Hutchins, (Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1952), 46; 7.
 9 William Desmond, Philosophy and Its Others: Ways of Being and Mind, (Albany, NY: State 
University of New York Press, 1990), 220. Ironically, bats are the ones that actually see in grey on 
grey, not owls. All allegories fall apart at some point.
 10 Hegel said, “reading the morning paper is the realist’s morning prayer. One orients one’s 
attitude toward the world either by God, or what the world is.” Hegel, Miscellaneous Writings 
of G.W.F. Hegel, in Spep Studies in Historical Philosophy, ed. Jon Stewart, (IL: Northwestern 
University Press, 2000), 247. The morning paper only contains the past events, thus this morning 
prayer is always groping through the grey on grey.
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metaxology is a “hermeneutic of desire.”11 Does desire arise because of lack or 
because of excess? Is desire based off of astonishment or off of a perplexity?12 
Astonishment leaves one in mysterious awe from excess. Perplexity on the other 
hand is a type of self-acknowledgment in that the person comes to sense a type 
of lack. The self can no longer see outside of the self. There is both excess and 
lack within desire, though lack often overrules. Childlike astonishment can turn 
into childish perplexity. One of Desmond’s goals is “to consider the resurrection 
of astonishment and perplexity….”13 This “resurrection”, the renewed thought 
concerning both excess and lack, plenty and poverty, is found in Desmond’s 
paradoxical “dark radiance.”14
The dark radiance, and the resurrection of astonishment and perplexity, is 
understood through a Desmondian understanding of agape and eros. Anders 
Nygren created a dualistic opposition between agape and eros, and whenever 
apage is used to overcome eros, one can usually trace that to Nygren.15 In reading 
Desmond, it is not so implausible to interpret that is he is using agape to overcome 
eros,16 because Desmond often speaks negatively of eros. However, to be more 
precise, Desmond is in actuality speaking negatively of the erotic absolute. Because 
of this negativity, one could easily disregard that Desmond speaks positively 
about erotic perplexity. Desmond is not using agape to overcome eros; rather, he 
is reuniting eros with its parents.17
Eros’ reunion with its parents is demonstrated through Desmond’s retelling 
of the story of Eros’ conception. Desmond’s reading of Eros contains within 
 11 William Desmond, Desire, Dialectic, and Otherness: An Essay on Origins (Chelsea, MI: 
Yale University Press, 1987), 9. See William Desmond, Perplexity and Ultimacy: Metaphysical 
Thoughts From the Middle (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1995), 21.
 12 Desmond, Being and the Between, 20.
 13 William Desmond, The Intimate Strangeness of Being: Metaphysics After Dialectic 
(Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2012), 293. And again, “Our 
aging, even our dying, can be a different beginning, a different birth—rebirth of the agapeic 
astonishment before the glory of creation.” See Desmond, Being and the Between, 297.
 14 William Desmond, God and the Between (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2008), 340. 
 15 Anders Nygren, Agape and Eros, trans. Philip S. Watson, Revised (Philadelphia, PA: 
Westminster Press, 1953).
 16 For instance, even the respected scholar Joris Geldhof seems to have interpreted Desmond 
as being in alignment with Nygren. “It is possible [unlike Desmond], however, not to conceive of 
eros and agape in terms of a sharp contrast, but to consider them complimentary.” Joris Geldhof, 
“The Between and the Liturgy: On Rendering W. Desmond’s Philosophy Fruitful for Theology,” 
in Between Philosophy and Theology: Contemporary Interpretations of Christianity, ed. Lieven 
Boeve and Christophe Brabant (Surrey: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2010), 92.
 17 For further discussion see Desmond, Perplexity and Ultimacy, 104-105.
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it a duality, that of Poros and Penia, resource and poverty.18 The conceiving of 
Eros happened during a feast of the gods, whereupon Poros was inebriated on 
nectar and seduced by Penia, who conceived the child Eros. Eros is the love-
child of plenty and lack. Thus, he lacks because of his mother; however, he is also 
overflowing with abundance because of his father. Eros was a daimon—a between 
being.19 The divine festivity, coupled with the resourceful Poros, represents an 
overflowing abundance; an agapeic and hyperbolic excessive givenness. 
Poros is eternally resourceful, thus Poros never lacks. Because Eros is conceived 
of resource, it is imitative and resourceful like its father, Poros. However, Eros’ 
mother Penia is always lacking in her poverty and Eros is also imitative of its 
lacking mother. Eros, as a between being, occupies a special space between 
resource and poverty. Eros is more than imitative of its parents, for in the between 
space, Eros is also able to be creative in a sense. Eros is able to transcend lack. Lack 
cannot go beyond lack, only excess can go beyond lack. However, excess cannot go 
beyond lack unless it has lack, which excess will never have. This is why Eros is so 
vital. Poros as Poros cannot transcend lack, for Poros is always resourceful, thus 
never experiencing lack. Eros cannot transcend lack apart from the prior excess 
which it has been granted.
“We must say that erotic perplexity is born from agapeic astonishment.”20 
Desire from lack is not necessarily a bad thing, the danger comes with the 
“amnesia of its own birth;”21 this is when the monster is born, and Hegel’s erotic 
absolute overtakes. In other words, the Platonic eros is always a between, whereas, 
the Hegelian eros always emphasizes lack and therefore returns the self to the self, 
albeit via the other. This is also known as what Bonhoeffer calls the “heavenly 
double” or what Desmond calls the “counterfeit double.” 
Bonhoeffer gives wonderful pragmatic insight into this type of erotic 
and agapeic love in a letter he wrote to Eberhard Bethge, his best friend and 
biographer, on May 20, 1944. Bethge had voiced concern that his thoughts were 
occupied with his love for Renata, his wife, and that, in a sense, it could be taking 
away from his love towards God. Dietrich responded,
 18 Desmond, Desire, Dialectic and Otherness, 211, note no. 14.
 19 Plato, Symposium, trans. Seth Benardete (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), l; 
202b–203a.
 20 Desmond, Being and the Between, 14.
 21 Ibid. “Let us not forget the crucial ambiguity in the transition from agapeic astonishment to 
erotic perplexity—namely, the birth of the latter out of the former, but the possible forgetting of 
the former in the latter’s sense of lack or ignorance.” Ibid., 16.
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There is a danger, in any passionate erotic love, that through it you may lose 
what I’d like to call the polyphony of life. What I mean is that God, the Eternal, 
wants to be loved with our whole heart, not to the detriment of earthly love or to 
diminish it, but as a sort of cantus firmus to which the other voices of life resound 
in counterpoint.22
Bonhoeffer and Bethge were both musicians—Dietrich almost became a 
professional musician but decided to become a theologian instead—so it makes 
sense that he could write with such musical metaphors. The cantus firmus (lit. 
“fixed song”) is the preexisting melody which forms the basis of a polyphonic 
composition, where a polyphonic composition has two or more simultaneous 
lines of independent melody. The most beautiful polyphonic songs need 
counterpoint if they are to be truly beautiful, and they are held together by the 
cantus firmus. Bonhoeffer knew this and he likened the cantus firmus to a type of 
agapeic excess of love poured into our hearts by God, and the counterpoint to a 
type of erotic perplexity of human love shared among one another. Both elements 
are absolutely vital. This “polyphony of life” is nothing less than a simplified way 
of describing what Bonhoeffer also called the ultimate and penultimate things, 
and that these are related to each other through desire as both excessive and 
lacking.
According to Desmond, and Bonhoeffer, the Platonic eros is always a between, 
whereas, the Hegelian eros always emphasizes lack and therefore returns Myself 
to Myself, albeit via an “other.” This would be the case if one had forgotten about 
the cantus firmus. It is now with mindfulness of desire as both lack and plenty 
that we discuss the “being” of God.
The Analogy of Relation
Is Desmond reestablishing a type of analogy of being? Persons such as John 
Milbank interpret him in this way.23 However, if he is doing something different, 
then the question we must ask is, “what separates Desmond’s thinking of the 
between from the metaphysics of analogy in Aquinas?”24 John Caputo interprets 
the metaxological to be different than this classical metaphysics of analogy for the 
 22 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, DBWE 08, Letters and Papers From Prison, ed. John W. de Gruchy, 
trans. Isabel Best (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2009), DBWE 8:393-394.
 23 John Milbank, “The Double Glory,” in Slavoj Zizek and John Milbank, The Monstrosity of 
Christ: Paradox or Dialectic, ed. Creston Davis (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2009), 110-233.
 24 John Caputo, “Foreword,” in William Desmond, The William Desmond Reader, ed. 
Christopher Ben Simpson (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2012), vii.
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same reasons as myself, namely, “it emphasizes the concrete and experiential….”25 
This does not mean that Desmond is denying classical metaphysics in the slightest, 
but rather, his journey is saturated with a type of phenomenology of experience 
and relation, which I see to be in perfect agreement with what Dietrich Bonhoeffer 
called the analogy of relation in his lecture series on Creation and Fall. 
In God and the Between, Desmond uses the phrase “God being over-being” 
to convey that God’s overdetermined excess enables the ethos of being. “God is 
not the between or a being in the between but hyperbolic,”26 and the hyperbolic 
excess is blinding. How does one discuss this “dark radiance”? The best way is to 
describe it in terms of the relational imagery which Desmond paints in the last 
paragraph of God and the Between,
Our end is in that dark light. And in that dark light we end. There is a ‘being 
nothing’ that purges our clogged porosity, letting us differently sojourn in the 
between. In an ultimate patience, I am nothing, the other is more than enough 
to fill the heart, there is nothing between us, nothing but the enabling between 
...There is nothing empty about the nothing we have become.27
This imagery of nothing is strikingly similar to the type of imagery which 
Bonhoeffer used in order to describe creation, freedom, and the analogy of 
relation (which he proposed in contradistinction to the analogy of being).
Between Creator and creature there is simply nothing. Therefore, creation is one 
of freedom, there is no necessity when there is nothing between them...and thus, 
it is a creation ex nihilo....[There is] no kind of necessity....Creation comes out of 
nothing.28
Bonhoeffer is here describing the classical doctrine of creation ex nihilo in 
terms of the nothing between the Creator and the creature. And because there 
is nothing, the creation can be one of absolute freedom. Contra Hegelian 
necessity, Bonhoeffer is claiming absolute freedom on God’s part. And contra 
(his interpretation of ) Barth, he is claiming that God’s freedom is not merely a 
freedom from, but a freedom for . And following this, the creature, created in the 
image of God, is likewise free for the other. This is the analogy of relation. The 
reason Bonhoeffer cannot maintain the unmovable orders of creation is because 
 25 Ibid., vii.
 26 Desmond, God and the Between, 288.
 27 Ibid., 340.
 28 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, DBWE 03, Creation and Fall, ed. John W. de Gruchy, trans. Douglas 
S. Bax (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1997), DBWE 3:32. 
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these orders would end up espousing necessity on God’s part, not freedom. God 
creates out of freedom, and he continues to uphold out of freedom.
God is the giver of the primal ethos, the milieu of being in which all beings 
come to be, “the enabling milieu.”29 This milieu can also be referred to as “the 
between.” As I quoted earlier, “God is not the between or a being in the between 
but hyperbolic.”30 God, as the agapeic origin, gives the milieu to be, and God 
is always hyperbolic with respect to the milieu.31 God gifts the between, but is 
always hyperbolic to the between. God exceeds the between as agapeic origin. 
All beings exist within the between and are gifted to be between beings. Being is 
granted, and unfortunately taken for granted on many occasions.32 
If God grants beings to be, it means that God is more than being. Desmond 
states that “God is another dimension”33 to the between. This other dimensionality 
is no surprise if we remember that Desmond repeatedly suggest in part IV of God 
and the Between that God is over-being.34 What does Desmond mean by over in 
over-being? Cyril O’Regan writes, “‘Over’ is Desmond’s version of the Greek 
hyper, the Latin super, and the German über.35 Over-being is “the actualizing 
origin that is the actual possibilizing ground of all possible being.”36 Nothing has 
being except through the givenness which has been enabled and granted through 
the over-being. God is over-being, and because beings are between beings, God 
is over-the-between.
Bonhoeffer, like Desmond, often referred to humans as between beings 
(primarily in Act and Being and Creation and Fall). The following excerpt from 
Bonhoeffer’s Creation and Fall helps explain one’s being in the between and God’s 
relation to it. When reading it, we need to keep in mind that for Bonhoeffer, “the 
beginning” has nothing to do with Euclidean or Newtonian temporality; “in 
the beginning” means “out of freedom and out of nothing.”37 The following was 
written by Bonhoeffer, though it reads as something Desmond himself could 
have written.
 29 Ibid., 3.
 30 Ibid., 288.
 31 Without this distinction we risk Spinozistic monism or Hegelian pan(en)theism.
 32 “We live in this manifestation and take it for granted, but then we take for granted the fact 
that it is granted, and that it is also a granting of itself.” Desmond, God and the Between, 12.
 33 Ibid., 4.
 34 See Desmond, God and the Between, Part IV.
 35 Cyril O’Regan, “Naming God in God and the Between,” Louvain Studies 36 (2012): 283, 
doi:10.2143/LS.36.2.2979762.
 36 Desmond, God and the Between, 285.
 37 Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall, DBWE 3:36.
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In the beginning God created heaven and earth. Not that first God was and 
then God created, but that in the beginning God created. This beginning is the 
beginning in the anxiety-causing middle and at the same time beyond the anxiety-
causing middle in which we have our being. We do not know of this beginning 
by stepping out of the middle and becoming a beginning ourselves. Because we 
could accomplish that only by means of a lie, we would then certainly not be in 
the beginning but only in the middle that is disguised by a lie. This needs to be 
kept clearly in mind in everything that follows. It is only in the middle that we 
come to learn about the beginning.38
Only by truly recognizing oneself in the middle, the real-center, does one 
come to learn about real-freedom. But pragmatically speaking, how does one be 
patient and responsible in the middle, for it does cause anxiety? No matter what, 
one is in the anxiety-causing middle. And Desmond and Bonhoeffer would 
likely agree with Kierkegaard, in the name of Vigilius Haufniensis, “whoever 
has learned to be anxious in the right way has learned the ultimate.”39 In order 
to abide and be responsible in the anxiety-causing middle, one needs to learn 
how to die, hence, the theology-of-the-cross. But we are not yet able to describe 
this death. We first turn to examining the tension between transcendence and 
autonomy.
Transcendence and Autonomy
Transcendence and autonomy both have the ability to create core problems 
in both philosophy and theology. On the one hand, modern philosophy of the 
autonomous subject promotes the subject as a self-transcending subject able 
to determine its own self-law, which is not a bad thing in itself. However, the 
subject can forget that the ability to determine the self-law was enabled from 
a superior transcendence. When this amnesia occurs, the autonomous subject 
determinately fixes its self-law as absolute, and “superior” transcendence 
becomes relative.40 On the other hand, if God is held so high as to be completely 
transcendent, it can convey the message that a chasm exists between God and 
the subjective individual, leaving the subject permanently detached from an 
 38 Ibid., DBWE 3:30–31.
 39 Søren Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Oriented Deliberation 
in View of the Dogmatic Problem of Hereditary Sin, trans. Alastair Hannay (NY: Liveright 
Publishing Corporation a Division of W.W. Norton & Company, 2014), 187. And adding to 
this, later on in the book, in the third to last sentence, he writes, “Therefore, the person who, in 
respect of guilt, is educated by anxiety will rest only in the Atonement.” (p. 196) Emphasis added.
 40 “And so it goes: metaphysical and scientistic univocity collude in the domestication of 
ultimate transcendence.” Desmond, BB, 236.
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eternally silent God. If superior transcendence is taken as absolute, then self-law 
which the subjective individual makes can only be relative at best.41 If God is 
over-being and subjective individuals are enabled to be between beings, does this 
change how autonomy and transcendence are appropriated?
Desmond answers this antinomy between autonomy and transcendence 
through the three senses of transcendence: the transcendence of the exterior, 
the interior, and the superior. The three senses of transcendence implicitly take 
their shape in Desmond’s early thoughts in Desire, Dialectic and Otherness, as an 
adaptation from Augustine which I alluded to earlier. 
Overall, we follow an itinerary reminiscent of St. Augustine’s description of the 
double movement of his own thought. According to him, ab exterioribus ad 
interiora, ab inferioribus ad superiora….This work exhibits aspects of what might 
be called an Augustinian odyssey, embarked on in the wake of Hegel….from 
exterior to interior…from interior to superior.42
This Augustinian odyssey is also a Bonhoefferian odyssey, for he wrote about 
this type of double movement of thought by writing, “All thinking always refers 
to something transcendent in two ways: retrospectively and prospectively.”43 
The suspension between these two is why Bonhoeffer could refer to humans as 
between beings.
In the previous excerpt from Desmond, neither the word “transcendence” 
nor “three” were mentioned, but the ideas are implicit, embedded as an external 
going beyond itself to grant something to the interior self, and in part the 
interior self then internalizes what has been granted to then go beyond itself as 
inferior and (re)turn to the superior.44 The double movement—from exterior to 
interior and from inferior to superior—evolves and takes on an explicit threefold 
sense of transcendence in Desmond’s following books, in which he refers to their 
interactions in multiple ways: exterior-interior-superior; nature-self-God; first-
 41 “This is the antinomy: if autonomy is absolute, third transcendence has to be relativized; if 
third transcendence is absolute, autonomy must be relativized.” William Desmond, Hegel’s God: 
A Counterfeit Double (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd, 2005), 4. Abbreviated title: HG.
 42 Desmond, DDO, 13–14.
 43 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, DBWE 02, Act and Being: Transcendental Philosophy and Ontology 
in Systematic Theology, ed. Wayne Whitson Floyd and Hans-Richard Reuter, trans. Martin 
Rumscheidt (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1996), DBWE 2:34. Abbreviated title: A&B.
 44 “Metaxological metaphysics must think the doubleness of this tension between being in the 
midst and being referred by self-transcendence to the transcendence of what is other, what is over 
and above.” Desmond, BB, 44.
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second-third transcendences; T1-T2-T3.45 God is not the only transcendence: 
transcendence has three senses, for “trans is a going beyond or across towards 
what is not now oneself.”46 Nature does this, the self does this, and God does 
this. God is the only transcendent One in the hyperbolic sense of granting being. 
However, God is not the only transcendent one. Transcendence is a matter of 
remaining true to the self as well as true to the other;47 it also helps establish the 
relation with God. 
T3 is the enabling transcendence for both T1 and T2. If T3 is the superior, 
T3 makes itself known through T1 and T2 in immanence, thus, though it is 
absolutely transcendent, it is not absolutely transcendent.48 Or as Bonhoeffer 
wrote, “God’s ‘beyond’ is not what is beyond our cognition! Epistemological 
transcendence has nothing to do with God’s transcendence. God is the beyond 
in the midst of our lives.”49
T3 as enabling transcendence for T1 and T2 does not “prove” the existence of 
T3, a proof would reduce a mindfulness of what exceeds and enables the between 
to a univocal affair. It is attentiveness to T1 and T2 which makes one aware that 
there is an excess which cannot be explained in terms of immanence alone. T3 
is not proven, but rather grasped and witnessed to through mindfulness to the 
hyperboles of being.
With modernity, T3 has been sidelined—pushed to the extreme limits of 
transcendence outside of immanence—primarily because of the antinomies 
between autonomy and transcendence. Proofs for God’s existence were used 
to secure the self, therefore God was shown to be a moment in securing the 
self ’s place in the world. God being over-the-between enables a transcendent 
relatedness with beings. Because of this relatedness with beings, the three senses 
 45 “We need to distinguish at least these three kinds of transcendence, roughly corresponding 
to the other-being of nature, of the human self, and of the divine. I will use the shorthand T1, T2, 
T3. What is important is not only their character but their interrelation.” Desmond, HG, 2.
 46 Desmond, HG, 4.
 47 “I now call notice to a double unfolding that causes us to move from one sense to the next, 
as a more adequate effort to think through the truth of the happening of being. The double 
unfolding has to do, first with the self-coherence of the specific mode of being and mind, and 
second with its truthfulness to what is other to thought.” Desmond, BB, xiv.
 48 “Manifested transcendence is in immanence and hence not absolutely transcendent; and 
yet it is absolutely transcendent as revealed in immanence, for what is revealed is ever beyond 
encapsulation, even in immanence itself.” Desmond, BB, 219.
 49 Bonhoeffer, LPP, DBWE 8:367.
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of transcendence help bring clarity to being itself through four senses.50 These 
four senses of being which will be discussed in section 5, are “signs in immanence 
of what transcends immanence and cannot be fully determined in immanent 
terms.”51 For now, we turn to discuss the passio essendi.
A Hermeneutic of Passio Essendi 
 These signs in immanence are incarnated because “transcendence comes to 
us as an advent; this is the patience of an original opening.”52 In waiting for the 
incarnated advent, patience can wear thin.53 When T3 is silent, the self seeks 
to make determinate that which is indeterminate. Impatient beings seek to give 
birth to their own autonomous selves. However, “self-transcending (T2) is first 
energized by the given endowment of the passio essendi, and only then by the 
endeavor of the conatus essendi.”54 The conatus essendi, the endeavor of being, is 
no longer mindful of its co-natus, the co-birth.55 Self-transcendence is not with-
birth apart from being patient to receive the incarnated gifting and enabling 
from divine transcendence, from God being over-the-between. 
Autonomous individuals have a tendency to take for themselves rather than 
to receive the granted incarnation. They take the body rather than receive the 
body, because they forget that “the conatus points back to the passio, as well 
as carrying it forward.”56 Passio is both a patience and a suffering: it is a true 
tolerance. When there is refusal to be patient, there is refusal to suffer, thus the 
conatus is neglected, even though the endeavor to be was the focus in the refusal 
to be patient.57 When patience is refused, the self stays “true” only to the self, but 
this staying “true” is not true at all because it refuses to witness to the superior 
transcendence which grants being in the first place.
 50 “Transcendence as other to us works along with human self-transcendence….I propose to 
give concrete articulation to the suggestion in terms of the four senses of being: the univocal, the 
equivocal, the dialectical and the metaxological.” Desmond, BB, 5.
 51 Desmond, GB, 8.
 52 Desmond, BB, 5.
 53 See Desmond, GB, 19.
 54 Desmond, GB, 24.
 55 Desmond takes advantage of the dual meaning implied within Conatus. Namely, he takes it 
to mean conari (try, endeavor, strive) as well as co-natus (co-birth).
 56 Desmond, GB, 34.
 57 “Does our understanding of our own self-transcending rely too much on the conatus essendi 
and not enough on the passio essendi.” Desmond, GB, 22.
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Without patience, people either try to force their ideal of the ultimate into 
the penultimate (and thereby show hostility towards God) or they turn their 
ideal of penultimate into the ultimate (and thereby show hostility towards this-
world). Upholding both penultimate and ultimate things, in and with patience, 
is a precarious and risky endeavor to be, and Bonhoeffer describes this by 
writing, “human beings could certainly once again attempt to move away from 
the middle that causes them anxiety and become a beginning themselves. They 
could endeavor to think of this nothing as something that in turn gives birth to 
creation.”58 Bonhoeffer and Desmond both see how, in the Hegelian system, one 
tries to find one’s own beginning and give birth to itself, by leaving the middle. 
However, this is a lie to ourselves, for “we ourselves are in the middle.”59
Earlier metaxology was addressed as being a “hermeneutic of desire.”60 It is 
now appropriate to handle this desire in writing that metaxology is a hermeneutic 
of passio essendi. By using this interpretive key, one is able to properly appropriate 
the four senses of being and dispel misinterpretations of the univocal, equivocal, 
and dialectical senses of being as “bad” and the metaxological as “good.”61 Thus, 
the four senses of being are interpreted through the passio essendi, and this will 
help us, as theologians, learn how to be responsible in the between. 
On Closed System and Faithful Discourse of the Between
Thus far, I refrained from beginning with the fourfold senses of being, 
because focusing on this “system” at the beginning can detract from God as over-
being.62 “There is no claim to a closed system. System is for me an after-the-fact 
articulation of the matter that must be allowed to take its own shape. System does 
not dictate to the unfolding matter what form it should take.”63 As can be seen, 
Desmond is not opposed to system, so long as the system is not determinately 
fixed and dictating the form. However, could not the repeated usage of the terms 
pertaining the univocal, equivocal, dialectical and metaxological, and the form 
they take, make one believe that it is a closed system? Christopher Ben Simpson 
 58 Bonhoeffer, C and F, DBWE 3:33. Emphasis added.
 59 Ibid., DBWE 3:30
 60 Desmond, DDO, 9. See Desmond, PU, 9, 21.
 61 It is true that Desmond often writes against the univocal, the equivocal, and the dialectical; 
however, his words must be taken in context.
 62 “There is no claim to a closed system. System is for me an after-the-fact articulation of the 
matter that must be allowed to take its own shape. System does not dictate to the unfolding 
matter what form it should take.” Desmond, PU, 10.
 63 Ibid.
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does not write that metaxology is a closed system, but he does write that 
“Desmond begins his metaphysics with the “how” of metaphysics.”64 However, if 
Desmond begins his metaphysics with the “how,” then has not Desmond created 
a closed system or a “logic,”65 as Simpson labels it? In other words, beginning 
with “how” seems to dictate the unfolding of its form in “how” it is done, thus 
creating a closed system. 
Beginning with the “how” undoes the hermeneutic of desire and passio essendi 
because there is no longer a faithful discourse of the between, between self and 
the other, but only the univocal affair of the “how.” If the fourfold is treated as the 
“how,” then one could logically conclude, like Simpson, that “Desmond moves 
from the “how” of metaphysics [the fourfold]…to the “what” of metaphysics…
its objects (the three transcendences).”66 However, the three transcendences are 
not an objectifiable “what.” Desmond himself stresses against “what.” “Not what 
they are, but that they are at all, is the marvel of metaphysical mindfulness.”67 
In one way or another, Simpson’s systematization (“how” and “logic”) and 
objectification (“what”) has failed to confirm the double movement of fidelity 
between self and others, thus, it is no longer a discourse of the between. Rather, it 
absolutizes the metaxological in the same way that Hegel absolutizes the dialectical. 
It is arguable that metaxology is often expressed through the three 
transcendences and the fourfold senses of being, and that Desmond’s writings 
confirm this. However, the three and the four cannot be relegated to the “how” 
and the “what.” The four senses of being are not “how” to do metaphysics; 
rather they are the hyperbolic senses of being which are gifts from superior 
transcendence made known as signs in immanence through faithful discourse in 
and of the between.
Metaxological Being
Being mindful to the previous disclaimers and maintaining fidelity to 
the givenness, the poetic system of being now emerges through the univocal, 
equivocal, dialectical, and metaxological senses. Vigilance is used in appropriating 
each sense through the hermeneutic of the passio essendi. 
 64 Christopher Ben Simpson, Religion, Metaphysics, and the Postmodern: William Desmond and 
John D. Caputo, Indiana Series in the Philosophy of Religion (Bloomington and Indianapolis: 
Indiana University Press, 2009), 28. Emphasis mine.
 65 Ibid. Though Simpson does credit Desmond with not calling it a “logic.”
 66 Ibid., 45.
 67 Desmond, BB, 225. Emphasis mine.
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The Idiocy of Being
The first sense of being is the univocal. The etymological definition of 
“univocal” means “having only one voice.” Desmond’s usage implies this 
etymological definition, as the following excerpt demonstrates.
The first sense, the univocal puts the emphasis on simple sameness, hence on the 
unmediated unity of the self and the other. The univocal sense has its place in our 
efforts to make sense of being but its unmediated sense of unity cannot do proper 
justice to the complex differences between philosophy and its others.68 
One-voice necessitates this simple sameness because there is reduction 
between the self and the other, where they coalesce into a type of simple sameness. 
There is only one voice. The univocal is the “that it is at all” of being. In having 
one voice, univocity seeks identification and intelligibility. Can the self obtain 
this intelligibility and know the “that it is” without fixing it to determinacy? The 
hermeneutic of passio essendi reveals the answer. 
If there is no passio essendi, then T2 (human-self ) views all of T1 (nature) 
and God (T3) as indeterminate and seeks to determinately fix them, because 
the impatience of being demands fixing determinate intelligibility and univocal 
sameness. In trying to determinately fix nature and God with mathematical 
univocity, nature and God are lost. When T3 is silent and not perceivable, we 
nonetheless seek determinate intelligibility, thus T1 becomes equated with T3 
and we are left with an absorbing God. Nature and God, and a type of monism. 
If there is no passio essendi within the univocal sense of being, then the conatus 
essendi is entirely trivial, for the lack of patience towards T1 and T3 means there 
can be no co-natus, no co-birth, for all birth is only self-same birth. The “that 
it is at all” becomes the “all that is.” Identification and intelligibility are both 
wonderful things granted to the self; however, the self does not always allow 
these wonderful things to be full-of-wonder because it takes them for granted if 
patience is lacking.
If, on the other hand, there is passio essendi, then the univocal sense of being 
sheds new light on what it means to be the “that it is” at all. Desmond refers to 
this as the idiotic, in the intimately personal sense of the etymology where there 
is actually idiot wisdom. This type of idiotic univocal sameness is made known, 
though it remains mysteriously indeterminate nonetheless. The knowability of 
the sameness is granted from T3, thus, there is a realization that there is not 
a complete determinate self-same unity throughout the cosmos. As Augustine 
 68 Desmond, PO, 4.
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said, “God is more intimate to me than I am to myself.”69 The idiotic sense of 
being is true to the self and true to the other, even in its simplicity of being the 
“that it is.” In being true to the self and the other, the idiotic self realizes that there 
is more than simple sameness, though it knows the importance of the intimately 
idiotic self. “To recognize that we need more than the univocal sense of being 
does not mean that we deny the need for the univocal sense, nor that it lacks its 
proper jurisdiction….”70 Univocity is a good thing, if it patiently remembers that 
the “that it is” was granted to be from the enabling agapeic origin. Without the 
idiocy of being there can be no aesthetics of happening, to which we now turn.
The Aesthetics of Happening
As stated, the idiotic sense realizes that in being true to itself and to the other, 
that their must necessarily be other(s), this otherness brings us to the equivocal 
sense. “By contrast (with the univocal), the equivocal sense breaks with the ideal 
of univocal unity and stresses those aspects of unmediated difference between 
the self and the other.”71 The etymology reveals that equivocity means “of equal 
voice.” It would be a gross misunderstanding to equate “of equal voice” to mean 
“one-voice,” especially given that Desmond is stressing the “unmediated” aspect 
of the equivocal. Two voices can only be equal if and only if they are other to 
each other, if they are not other to each other, then they are simply univocally 
the same. Because the voices are “equal,” the equivocal is often realized through 
dualisms or antinomies. It is crucial to (re)cognize the unmediated otherness of 
the equivocal. 
What is the role of the passio essendi as it pertains to the equivocal? If 
the equivocal sense of being refuses to have patience, then the outcome is a 
discontinuous plurality.72 If all things are discontinuous and there is no continuity, 
then T3 is completely other, completely transcendent and unknowable. In an 
impatient oppositional Cartesian dualism, “we conquer our bodies with our 
minds; we conquer the aesthetic givenness of the world with the mathematical 
dianoetics of our science and technology.”73 In other words, though the other 
is perceived (aesthetics), it is not determinately understood. If the other is not 
 69 See Augustine, Confessions 3.6.11. “tu autem eras interior intimo meo et superior summo meo.” 
Interior intimo meo may be translated as “more intimate to me than I am to myself.”
 70 Desmond, BB, 127.
 71 Desmond, PO, 4. Emphasis mine.
 72 Desmond refers to this type of discontinuous plurality as “Wittgensteinian.” See Desmond, 
PO, Introductory chapter, and also see Desmond, PU, 12.
 73 Desmond, GB, 64.
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determinately understood, then conquering it is a viable option. This conquering 
happens when there is no passio for the aesthetic.
An example from the movie Equilibrium does the best to illustrate this point:74 
The setting is 2072 in a post-World War III society. A totalitarian regime assumes 
world power and in their efforts to assume authority, they suppress all human 
emotions and desires through the forced usage of the drug called Prozium, the 
“opiate of our masses.” This drug is their salvation because it delivers them from 
all emotion, and thus any future wars. In the film there are law enforcers (called 
Clerics!) who kill any and all offenders, “sense offenders.” Thus persons caught 
with any form of art or expressing any emotions count as the sense offenders and 
are killed immediately. 
One of the sense offending characters in the film quotes W.B. Yeats, before 
he is shot and killed: “But I, being poor, have only my dreams. I have spread 
my dreams under your feet. Tread softly because you tread on my dreams.” The 
aesthetic was not tolerated. There was no passio for the aesthetic. As Desmond 
writes, “the equivocal is nowhere more evident than in human desire,”75 and 
human desire is nothing without the aesthetic. Mindfulness reveals that the 
other has laid down their dreams underneath the feet of the self, and it is the 
self ’s role to tread softly and patiently, for the others are poor and have only their 
dreams. This example has taken the equivocal to an extreme and shows how the 
equivocal can be a terrible thing when taken to its limits and the passio essendi is 
forgotten. Art, the aesthetic, has the power to (re)fuel our perception of others.76 
If, however, there is passio essendi within the equivocal sense, then we discover 
that “equivocity is not always just our failure of univocal logic, but is rooted in 
the character of being itself.”77 When rooted in being itself, the equivocal is the 
aesthetics of happening. The coming to pass of the senses of sensing the other. 
If the self is true to the senses, then the other is sensed and the self is given 
opportunity to be true to the other. However, if you “remove the paint of Rome 
[then] you undo her.”78 The passio essendi brings out the equivocal aesthetics of 
happening in being able to sense the other, while also maintaining the univocal 
 74 Kurt Wimmer, Equilibrium, Film, 2003.
 75 Desmond, BB, 110.
 76 Desmond, GB, 38.
 77 Desmond, BB, 88. “I want to propose that aesthetic appearing [of being] is equivocal in 
terms that are not merely negative.” Desmond, BB, 89.
 78 Regina Maria Schwartz, Sacramental Poetics at the Dawn of Secularism. When God Left 
the World (Standford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008), 31. Schwartz is quoting Aston, 
England’s Iconoclasts, 6. In this quote there is here an intrinsic connection between the aesthetic, 
the religious, and the ethical.
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idiotic singularity of the self. It allows the self to be true to the self and the others. 
Now we turn to see if there is a dialectical mediation of the equivocal which 
brings about a higher unity of sorts while not sacrifice the idiocy of being.
The Erotics of Selving
In order to discuss the erotics of selving, it is crucial to discuss the form of 
dialectic proposed by Hegel, where his dialectic not only contains epistemology, 
but also ontology, hence “the real is rational and the rational is real.”79 To clear 
Hegel of fraudulent charges, it is a gross misrepresentation of Hegel to say that 
his dialectic is the formulaic idea of thesis-antithesis-synthesis. These terms 
are better attributed to Fichte.80 However, Hegel’s system did have a threefold 
rhythmic heartbeat which continued to build upon itself, until ultimately 
reaching the final Absolute Spirit. If this is the case, does this not mean that his 
system turned into the univocal identity which he sought to avoid, the very thing 
which he critiqued in his contemporary Friedrich Schelling?81 
Hegel often employs the analogy of the plant, where the concept is in the 
germ (i.e., potentiality). Hegel focused on immediacy and immanence in the first 
stage. From this immediacy we discover, in stage two, that the concept’s ascending 
movement contradicts itself. “The dialectic of concept consists not in simply 
producing the determination as a contrary and restriction, but in producing and 
seizing upon the positive content and outcome of the determination, because 
it is this which makes it solely a development and immanent progress.”82 In the 
third stage, the resolution necessarily arises.83 The fascinating feature of Hegel’s 
dialectic is that it necessarily arises out of itself—out of the concept—and nothing 
external to the thing itself.84 His system is rational in the sense that the rationality 
emerges from the thing, rather than coming from an outside rationality. If the 
Absolute truly exists and it has the structure of conceptual necessity, then we can 
 79 Hegel, “The Philosophy of Right,” preface.
 80 Frederick Charles Copleston, “Hegel,” in A History of Philosophy, (Garden City, NY: Image 
Books, 1962), 7; 177.
 81 “If being is always being and nothingness always nothingness, there is no becoming.” Julian 
Marias, History of Philosophy, trans. Stanley Appelbaum and Clarence C. Strowbridge, (Mineola, 
NY: Dover Publications, 1967), 322.
 82 Hegel, The Philosophy of Right, sec. 31.
 83 Ibid.
 84 “To consider a thing rationally means not to bring reason to bear on the object from the 
outside and so tamper with it, but to find that the object is rational on its own account.” Hegel, 
The Philosophy of Right, sec. 31.
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derive it through a purely conceptual argument, where the concept will bring 
about its own incoherence and indispensability. Thus, concept must necessarily 
be an ascending dialectic.
A central theme of Hegelian philosophy is that the “Spirit comes to know 
himself….it must grow through struggle to self-knowledge.”85 If there is truly this 
ascending dialectic, then the answers are found within the things themselves, 
not simply in one’s own reasoning of these things. This is why one can say that 
Hegel’s system contains “self-thinking thought” or “thought thinking itself.” 
Also embedded within Hegel’s dialectic, one may also say it is “thought thinking 
itself and its others;”86 however, Desmond criticizes Hegel, for even though 
thought does think of its other, the other has been redefined relatively to the self. 
Namely, if the ascending dialectic converges upon the Absolute by necessity, and 
if this is the self-coming to know itself, then this means that the Absolute (T3) 
has actually been redefined in terms of the self (T2).87 Thus, all transcendence is 
immanent. 
Hegelian dialectic in all its glory encapsulates the Absolute Idea as the final 
synthesis of the dialectical process, thus ending the process and requiring that this 
whole system be grossly self-determined or self-mediated—reducing everything 
to a univocal unity which it originally sought to criticize. Thus, even though 
there is an other, the other actually turns out to be the self. We remind ourselves 
that Hegelian eros always emphasizes lack and therefore returns the self to the 
self, albeit via the other. Hegel’s Absolute is an Erotic Absolute, in the sense that 
Eros becomes the bastard child and forgets the Poros father. There is only lack in 
Hegelian dialectics.88 
If Hegelian dialectic avoids asymmetry and mystery, and grants no form of an 
agapeic otherness,89 one must ask how does Desmond recapitulate dialectics in 
his philosophical method.
The dialectical sense, criticizes univocal unity…and even though it too criticizes 
the limits of univocal unity, dialectical thinking still tries to mediate equivocal 
difference….But the dialectical sense of being shows an ambiguous tendency to 
 85 Charles Taylor, Hegel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 127. 
 86 Desmond, PO, 11.
 87 See Desmond, HG, 4
 88 “Dialectic, then, arises in response to lack of articulate identity…What presents itself to desire 
at this point is the possibility of an end but not the end, a possible whole but not the whole….we can 
think of ourselves as possible wholes without confusing ourselves with the whole; we may discover 
an absolute dimension to our beings without regarding ourselves as the absolute.” DDO, 125.
 89 “But there is no asymmetry in Hegel.” Desmond, BB, 249. “There are no final mysteries for 
Hegel’s dialectical concept.” Desmond, PU, 50.
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interpret all mediation primarily in terms of self-mediation…this tends to happen 
with Hegel.90 
Dialectic is a useful tool for mediating differences. However, we see with 
Hegel’s system that it has the tendency to become a self-mediated system where 
otherness is excluded and the system becomes totalizing. Desmond is not 
opposed to dialectic, however, he encourages that “we must rethink it in terms 
that do not sacrifice idiotic singularity”91 as Hegel does,92 recalling that idiotic 
singularity is a healthy univocity which contains within it the patience of being. 
And at this point, it is pertinent to realize that this is precisely how Bonhoeffer 
critiqued Hegel,
The tragedy of all idealist philosophy was that it never ultimately broke through 
to personal spirit. However, its monumental perception, especially in Hegel, was 
that the principle of spirit is something objective, extending beyond everything 
individual—that there is an objective spirit, the spirit of sociality, which is distinct 
in itself from all individual spirit. Our task is to affirm the latter without denying 
the former, to retain perception without committing the error.93
Bonhoeffer, like Desmond, affirms an objective spirit of sociality, à la Hegel, 
while never denying the individual, personal spirit, as was tragically the case with 
Hegel’s absolute. Bonhoeffer essentially combined the thoughts of Hegel and 
Kierkegaard, so as to affirm a spirit of sociality and individuality. In other words, 
Hegelian dialectic does not contain any elements of the passio essendi or healthy 
anxiety, for it is entirely self-determining where there is no birthing-with, but 
rather, only self-birth. As Bonhoeffer wrote, “the I understands itself from itself 
within a closed system.”94
As one can see, dialectic is closely connected with T2 and can lead to an erotic 
absolute if the antinomy of transcendence and autonomy is ignored because of 
impatience. We ought to remind ourselves that neither Desmond nor Bonhoeffer 
are not opposed to dialectic. The hermeneutic of the passio essendi reveals both 
Desmond’s and Bonhoeffer’s misgivings toward Hegelian dialectic, in that it fails 
to be true to the self and true to the other. 
 90 Desmond, PO, 4.
 91 Desmond, PU, 63.
 92 See Desmond, PU, 59.
 93 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, DBWE 01, Sanctorum Communio: A Theological Study of the Sociology 
of the Church, ed. Clifford Green, trans. Reinhard Krauss and Nancy Lukens (Minneapolis: 
Fortress Press, 1998), DBWE 1:74. 
 94 Bonhoeffer, A and B, DBWE 2:76. See “Thinking is in itself a closed circle, with the ego as 
the center” DBW 10:424.
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When there is a patience of being and tolerance, we do not arrive at the erotic 
absolute, rather we come to experience erotic selving; that is, the counterpoint 
in the polyphony of life. Erotic selving does not forget the cantus firmus or that 
there is a hyperbolic excess which comes from the enabling milieu of being out 
of agapeic gifting. Therefore, greater unity does exist in the dialectical erotics of 
selving and it does not sacrifice the idiocy of being. It is a unity without separation, 
to borrow the phraseology from Chalcedon. In having this new unity, the discourse 
of the between must now progress as a way of maintaining a fidelity to the other. 
To this we now turn.
The Agapeics of Community
Desmond described a healthy dialectic as a corrective to Hegel, but this 
healthy dialectic is not the end. If one can call the dialectical erotics of selving 
a positive unity without separation, Desmond’s metaxological agapeics of 
community maintains fidelity to otherness in that it cultivates a rich sense of 
positive difference—without confusion—to compliment this unity.95 The 
metaxological is not better than the univocal, equivocal, or dialectical, rather 
it is simply another sense of being. Desmond says it best as follows: “I suggest 
that as dialectic tries to redeem the promise of univocity beyond equivocity, so 
the metaxological tries to redeem the promise of equivocity beyond univocity and 
dialectic.”96 
Metaxology is the promise of equivocity, the “without confusion” (to borrow 
more Chalcedonian terminology). The etymology of the word metaxology 
derives from the Greek metaxu and logos, thus it is a discourse of the between.97 
We can see that the etymology is certainly hinting at this positive difference, 
the promise of equivocity. Etymology alone does not help us understand what 
Desmond is communicating by this word though. 
Desmond goes on to “define the metaxological sense of being in dynamic 
interrelation to the three other senses: namely, the univocal, the equivocal, and the 
dialectical senses of being.”98 If the promise of equivocity is defined in dynamic 
interrelation to the other three, it must mean that the other three are necessarily 
“good,” at least in some sense. This has been communicated with the passio 
essendi preceding the conatus essendi in the form of the univocal idiocy of being, 
 95 See Desmond, DDO, 123. 
 96 Desmond, BB, 178. Emphasis mine.
 97 Desmond, PO, 3.
 98 Ibid., 4.
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the equivocal aesthetics of happening, and the dialectical erotics of selving. “It 
is a mindful passio essendi prior to and presupposed by every conatus essendi of 
the mind desiring to understand this or that.”99 In the patience of being there 
has been (co)birthed healthy children of idiocy, aesthetics, erotics and agapeics. 
These four are “signs in immanence of what transcends immanence and cannot 
be fully determined in immanent terms.”100
Metaxology is a celebration feast of sameness, otherness, a unity of the 
otherness, and a community of wholes.101 It would be a misnomer to perceive 
metaxology as being opposed to univocal sameness, equivocal otherness, and 
dialectical unity. The metaxological arises from the univocal while being true to 
the self and the other, proceeds to the equivocal and maintains its fidelity to the 
self and other because of the passio essendi, and in fidelity to the self and other, 
shows that a metaxological promise of equivocity as a community of wholes is 
needed to compliment the dialectical promise of univocity. The only way to have 
a metaxological community of wholes is to have an overdetermined abundance. 
Each of these four senses of beings is just that, a sense of being. These senses of 
being are granted from the overdetermined excess. As Aristotle said, “being is 
said in many ways”102 and the metaxological shows us that the patience of being 
allows for being to be spoken in many ways. This does not mean that Desmond 
has a cap on metaphysics, and he reminds us that the fourfold senses of being 
“help define the truth of the metaxological, but we risk error when they are 
absolutized and claimed to cover the entire milieu of being.”103 We must avoid 
making the metaxological absolute, learning our lesson from the way in which 
Hegel made the dialectical absolute.
Being Responsible in the Between
Bonhoeffer’s Pragmatic Fourfold
From my reading of Bonhoeffer, I view him as incredibly pragmatic, whereas 
Desmond appears to be more concerned with correct thinking (that being said, 
Desmond is also pragmatic while Bonhoeffer is also concerned with correct 
thinking, it is simply a matter of emphases as to how I read them both). What 
 99 Desmond, ISB, 264.
 100 Desmond, GB, 8.
 101 In other words, metaxology “tries to name the mediation between a plurality of wholes.” 
Desmond, DDO, 124.
 102 Desmond, BB, 34.
 103 Ibid., xii.
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I mean to infer is that when it comes to the fourfold senses of being, Desmond 
does an astounding job of describing all the interrelated connections; however, 
Bonhoeffer was able to make the connection with the concrete lived reality far 
more clearly than Desmond has communicated thus far. The following is from 
Bonhoeffer’s Ethics,
The commandment of God revealed in Jesus Christ is addressed to us in the church, 
in the family, in work, and in government. [...] None of these authorities can 
identify itself alone with the commandment of God. The sovereignty of the 
commandment of God proves itself precisely in ordering these authorities in a 
relationship of being [1] with each other, [2] beside each other, [3] together with 
each other, and [4] over against each other.104
When Bonhoeffer referred to church, family, work, and government, 
these are what he referred to as “orders of preservation” or “divine mandates,” 
as opposed to “orders of creation.” On occasion, he also labeled culture and 
marriage as mandates. But in other writings he could loosely identify a concept, 
such as “struggle,” as an order of preservation. In Bonhoefferian studies, labeling 
“what” the orders of preservation (or mandates) often takes precedent over the 
way being. This is sensed through the interrelatedness between the mandates. 
However, I am of the conviction that the most important aspect of the mandates 
was their fourfold interrelation. The following table neatly demonstrates how 
Desmond’s fourfold senses of being, which are interpreted through the passio 
essendi, are correlated with the way in which Bonhoeffer’s mandates interact 
with one another.
Desmond Fourfold Bonhoeffer
Idiocy of Being Univocal Being with each other
Aesthetics of Happening Equivocal Being beside each other
Erotics of Selving Dialectical Being together with each other
Agapeics of Community Metaxological Being over-against each other
I have previously affirmed that metaxology is a celebration feast of sameness 
(being with each other), otherness (being beside each other), a unity of the 
otherness (being together with each other), and a community of wholes (being 
over against each other). However, one must be mindful that being a responsible 
 104 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, DBWE 06, Ethics, ed. Clifford J. Green, trans. Charles West Reinhard 
Krauss and Douglas Stott (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2005), DBWE 6:380. Abbreviated title: E.
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community of wholes does not mean submission in se, rather, it actually affirms 
resistance, when necessary. Concretely, one could thus infer that “church” 
(a mandate), while it does stand dialectically together with “government” (a 
mandate), there are times, however, when “church” must stand metaxologically 
over-against the “government.” Government is not an unmovable order of 
creation, but merely one of preservation, and there are times when it needs to be 
resisted.105 This goes in both directions, and applies to all of the mandates. And 
only by applying it in all directions, to all the mandates, is one being responsible 
in the between.
At this point it is noteworthy to mention that the Letters and Papers from 
Prison are actually entitled “Resistance and Submission” in German (Widerstand 
und Ergebung). And in them, Bonhoeffer often gives reference to the Spanish 
novel, The Ingenious Nobleman Sir Quixote of La Mancha, by Miguel de Cervantes 
Saavedra. In this tragicomedy, Don Quixote and his submissive companion, 
Sancho Panza set out on a crusade together. But what is most pertinent to the 
story is that Don Quixote represents “resistance” (the promise of equivocity) 
and Sancho Panza represents “submission” (the promise of univocity), both 
to unhealthy degrees. And this tying together of resistance and submission is 
where Bonhoeffer provides pragmatic clarification over and above Desmond. 
For again, Bonhoeffer’s forth sense of being is being over against each other. In 
fact, “where being-over-against-one-another is no longer present, God’s mandate 
no longer exist.”106 An “agapeics of community” could lead one to believe that 
it leads to an illusory utopian existence where resistance is no longer necessary, 
but Bonhoeffer’s formulation dispels these falsehoods. However, even though 
resistance is affirmed, there is still a matter of allowing the self to die. To which 
we now turn. (Bonhoeffer’s literal hanging for political treason illustrates this 
point better than any words on the issue.)
Learning How to Die
As mentioned earlier, metaxology is a hermeneutic of passio essendi, where 
one is resurrected to excessive astonishment in one’s dying. In patiently waiting, 
God as over-being reveals the overdetermined hyperbolic signs in immanence of 
 105 For instance, when the Nazi government forced the Aryan clause upon Jewish members 
in the church, Bonhoeffer rightly declared this to be a state of confession. And in the years 
that followed, he continued to resist his government, to the point of being hanged for political 
treason. 
 106 Bonhoeffer, E, DBWE 6:394.
42 MELITA THEOLOGICA
transcendence which are often sensed to be idiotic, aesthetic, erotic, and agapeic. 
If astonishment is birthed by patience, then one may say that impatience kills 
astonishment. “A new patience of being is needed.”107 The irony is that the passio 
essendi itself is a suffering death, but it gives birth to life. Patiently waiting returns 
one to zero, to nothing.108
Desmond refers many times throughout his writings to what he refers to 
as “posthumous mind.”109 He uses a thought experiment, taken in part from 
Dostoyevsky’s near death experience, recorded in The Idiot, before the firing 
squad. The thought experiment is to imagine your own death, and then to 
imagine coming back from the grave to live life anew. Dostoyevsky (in the name 
of Prince Myschkin) shows the desire to live life anew and not waste a single 
moment, yet at the same time, he acknowledges the tension that in reality it is 
impossible to carry out in practice. When facing the firing squad, we want to 
live anew, however, we immediately forget this feeling when granted reprieve. 
Desmond believes that it is exactly in dying in this way, again and again, that 
one is able to resurrect astonishment. The resurrected astonishment is practiced 
through living the fourfold senses of being with mindfulness and fidelity to the 
passio essendi.110 
What might happen if metaxological mindfulness set at naught the dualistic 
opposition of self and other? Since the other would not then be radically 
opposed, you would have the simple pouring forth of benevolence, perhaps even 
the foolishness of turning the cheek....You might be either a dead man or a child, 
or if the latter, forgiveness and forget would quickly follow every hurt.111
Desmond’s thought experiment does not truly teach one how to die and be 
reborn with metaxological mindfulness, even though he does suggest the idea 
of turning the other cheek and offering forgiveness for every hurt. (He does not 
seem to leave much room for resistance.) Desmond’s metaphysics encourages 
one to have a tolerant and faithful discourse of the between, between self and 
others, sameness and otherness, inseparability and distinction, though it does 
 107 Desmond, GB, 33.
 108 “Suppose the return to zero were a death in that sense, that is, also a promise of rebirth, 
beyond all will to power? Posthumous mind would then entail a second astonishment before the 
agape of being.” Desmond, GB, 32.
 109 For instance, here are some of the instances of when Desmond speaks of posthumous mind: 
PO 278ff., 300, 304ff., 368-369; BB 36-37, 40, 43, 44, 192-93, 199, 200, 230, 264, 503; PU 44, 
53, 111, 163, 164, etc.
 110 See Desmond, ISB, 264 and GB, 33–35.
 111 Desmond, PO, 310.
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not appear to equip real-people with the humility or actual death which is 
required to accomplish this. In one sense, and I say this cautiously, Bonhoeffer 
may have critiqued Desmond in the same way he did Hegel, that is, “Hegel wrote 
a philosophy of angels, but not of human beings...112 In a sense, Bonhoeffer turns 
out to be more metaxological than Desmond. For Bonhoeffer, the posthumous 
mind—death as a thought experiment—would not have gone far enough. For 
Bonhoeffer, “Every time Christ calls, one is led into death.”113 It is an actual death, 
not simply a thought experiment. However, when one examines Bonhoeffer’s 
theology-of-the-cross, one always comes face-to-face with the life, death, and 
glorious resurrection of Christ. This is because he always applied “the triadic 
dynamic of the new humanity in Christ (incarnated, judged, resurrected) to 
the world.”114 The follower of Christ truly participates in Christ’s life, death, and 
resurrection, and because of this, Bonhoeffer could paradoxically conclude, “It 
is certain that...our life is hidden in death.”115 It is only by truly participating in 
Christ’s life, death, and resurrection, that one may be truly resurrected to both 
astonishment and perplexity, and thus live responsibly in the between. There is 
no being responsible apart from being conformed to the form of Christ.116
Desmond’s metaphysics has shown us that there is a way to have a tolerant 
and faithful discourse of the between, between self and others, sameness and 
otherness, inseparability and distinction. Bonhoeffer’s theology-of-the-cross 
shows one how to be responsible in the between by fully participating in the 
life, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ, here and now. And more so than 
Desmond, Bonhoeffer helps us realize that this does not mean a utopian 
existence, but one of conformation with and toward Christ. 
In first describing the theologian-of-the-cross, Martin Luther wrote in Thesis 
20 of the Heidelberg Disputation, to be a theologian-of-the-cross means to 
view all things “through suffering and the cross.” The metaxological philosopher 
and the theologian-of-the-cross help each other realize that the passio essendi 
always comes before the co-natus essendi, suffering before co-birth, death before 
resurrection glory, Good Friday before Easter Sunday. If one is able faithfully 
 112 Bonhoeffer, A and B, DBWE 2:42.
 113 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, DBWE 04, Discipleship, ed. Geffrey B. Kelly and John D. Godsey, 
trans. Barbara Green and Reinhard Krauss (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2000), DBWE 4:87. 
Translation altered.
 114 Jens Zimmermann, “Dietrich Bonhoeffer and Marting Heidegger: Two Different Visions of 
Humanity,” in Bonhoeffer and Continental Thought: Cruciform Philosophy, ed. Brian Gregor and 
Jens Zimmermann (Boomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2009), 104.
 115 Bonhoeffer, LPP, DBWE 8:514. Translation altered.
 116 Bonhoeffer, E, DBWE 6:76-102.
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maintain the passio essendi by viewing all things “through suffering and the 
cross,” one will be responsible in the between. The challenge for theologians is 
to appropriate this towards contemporary matters which bring forth questions 
of identity and difference, such as, but certainly not limited to, ecumenism and 
interreligious dialogue.
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